Abstract and Keywords

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the world’s territory was carved into a handful of colonial empires. With few exceptions, the so-called ‘new imperialism’ of these years incorporated states into the world system either as colonizers or colonized. Japan’s case was unusual: the country started out as a victim of imperialism in the nineteenth century, but became an aggressor in the twentieth. Accounts of Japan’s empire have often fixated on the peculiarities of a non-Western, late-developing imperial power—what one of the architects of the field of Japanese colonial studies called ‘an anomaly of modern history’. The inter-connections between Japanese imperialism in mainland East Asia, the conclusion of the Chinese civil war, and heightened Cold War friction in the immediate post-Second World War period are re-examined here as distinct regional dynamics for the end of one empire and the rise of others in the 1940s and beyond.

Keywords: Japan, Japanese Empire, Imperial Japan, Second World War, Southeast Asia, Sino-Japanese War, Manchuria, Korea, decolonization
Like the rest of the modern world, Japan developed in the crucible of empire. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the world’s territory was carved into a handful of colonial empires. With few exceptions, the so-called ‘new imperialism’ of these years incorporated states into the world system either as colonizers or colonized. Japan’s case was unusual: the country started out as a victim of imperialism in the nineteenth century, but became an aggressor in the twentieth. Accounts of Japan’s empire have often fixated on this exceptional quality: the peculiarities of a non-Western, late-developing imperial power—what one of the architects of the field of Japanese colonial studies called ‘an anomaly of modern history.’ To be sure, a long, hard look at the ways that race and culture set Japan apart from the imperialisms of Britain, France, and others offers much to ponder, as does what it meant for Japanese modernity to break free of the yoke of foreign domination and to acquire an empire of its own. As many have observed, Japan’s spectacular rise as a military and industrial power struck a blow against a ‘400-year-old system of European colonial dominance in Asia.’ Investigating what this signified for the structure of the world order, asking how Japan’s rise was understood by contemporaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and contemplating how we understand it today—these are all fruitful vantage points for this history.

And yet, we might take a different analytic approach and ask what happens when we eschew singularity in favor of comparability. What might we see if we view the Japanese empire as one among many in the global conjunctures of modern times? Entering a crowded field of old and new empires, Japan became both cause and effect of the ‘new imperialism’ and assembled a colonial empire in Korea, Taiwan, and South Manchuria. In the wake of the First World War, which dismantled the empires of the defeated powers and discredited military expansionism, Japan expanded its footprint in Asia through the creation of new forms of puppet-state colonialism. After defeat in 1945 and a seven-year occupation that integrated the state into the US-Cold War order, Japan recreated a sphere of influence within the ruins of its wartime empire. What lessons can imperial Japan teach us about the connections between nations and empires in the late nineteenth century? Of the global moment of the twenties and thirties, when the rise of anti-colonial nationalism and conflicts between ascending and declining powers brought new pressures on longstanding imperial structures? After the cataclysm of World War Two shattered the foundations of colonial empires and divided the globe up into the first, second, and third worlds, what did this moment of rupture and the end of empire mean for Japan and Asia?

**Defensive modernization/defensive imperialism**

The modern/empire/Japan story begins in the 1850s, when European and American gunboats forced Japan’s feudal federation to enter the world market and inter-state system under the disadvantageous terms of the unequal treaties. The political crisis that ensued led a coalition of samurai rebels to overthrow the old regime in 1868, putting into place a host of modernizing reforms that charted a path toward state-strengthening and
national expansion. In the early years of power, even as the new government leaders struggled to overcome the threat of armed insurrection and the economic disruptions of an open market—the flight of gold from the country, the devastation of the native cotton industry, rampaging inflation—they pursued an active expansionist agenda. Japan annexed territories along the frontiers of the Tokugawa federation, including the Ainu homeland of Ezochi (renamed Hokkaido) in 1869, the Ryukyu Kingdom (renamed Okinawa) in 1879, as well as the Kurile (confirmed by treaties with Russia in 1855 and 1875) and Bonin (claimed in 1862, renamed Ogasawara and placed under Japanese administration in 1875) islands. The government contemplated a major invasion of Korea in 1873 and a launched a military expedition to Taiwan the following year. Japan sent a gunboat to Korea in 1876—and forced the Joseon Kingdom to submit to an unequal treaty even while lobbying European diplomats unsuccessfully for the revision of their own unequal treaties. Thus, Japan embarked on imperialism under the imperialist gun and offered an example of the synchronicity of colonization and colonialism as well as a state that was both subject and object of empire.

The salience of the Western threat (not just for Japan, but for all East Asia) meant that the revolutionary transformations within the country took place against a geo-political realignment of the region. The self-strengthening movement in Japan both reacted to and affected the inter-state system in East Asia, an instance of what Jon Halliday called "the dialectic of the internal and the external." Gunboat diplomacy and the unequal treaties touched off similar political crises within China and Korea, which intensified mutual influences between the three states. Revolutionaries and reformers circulated between Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and beyond, and brought with them boatloads of ideas: the intellectual ferment generated by the threat of European encroachment and local engagements with European concepts of politics, economy, and history. Japanese leaders sought to overturn the longstanding Sino-centric order, triggering a struggle for influence in the Korean court and an arms race that broke out in war with China in 1894-1895. Japanese victory and the crippling terms of the peace treaty that followed inverted the Sino-centric regional order and installed Japan as East Asian hegemon and accelerated the 'carve up' of China. This brought Japan into the center of great-power rivalries in Asia. After a coalition of France, Germany, and Russia forced Japan to relinquish territorial claims in South Manchuria in 1898, Japan joined England in an anti-Russian alliance in 1902. Competing ambitions in Korea and Manchuria led Japan and Russia to war in 1904—a conflict that ended with Japan’s second military victory in the space of ten years. In the midst of these turbulent events, Japanese diplomats succeeded in renegotiating the unequal treaties and acquired full sovereignty in the inter-state system in 1899. Military victories yielded Japan a colony in Taiwan, a protectorate over Korea, and a sphere of influence in South Manchuria. By the end of the century Japan became an agent, not an object, of the diplomacy of imperialism.

Japan’s string of diplomatic and military victories caught the world’s attention. Newspaper headlines underscored the spectacular success of Japan’s economic and military development and the shocking triumph of an Asian over a European army; some raised the specter of a ‘yellow peril.’ But as spectacular as Japan’s rise to power
appeared at the time, the anomaly of a colored power in a white world order masked ways that Japanese expansionism was part of a broader reaction to British economic hegemony. Indeed, there are more than a few family resemblances between economic nationalisms in Japan, the United States, and Germany that led ‘late developing economies’ to become ‘late-comer empires.’ The German historical (Friedrich List) and American (Alexander Hamilton) schools of economics found receptive audiences throughout the world, as statesmen and bankers adopted and adapted each other’s policies to push back against Britain’s hegemonic market power and its ‘imperialism of free trade.’ Economic nationalism prescribed developmental and neo-mercantilist policies as well as the protection of infant industries at home, but also exclusive spheres of influence and even territorial annexations ‘when necessary’ to shield imperial markets from competition with more powerful British trading interests. In this connection, Japan’s alignment of defensive economic modernization and defensive imperialism was less an exception than is often imagined, and neither was its determination to drive China and Russia out of Korea and lay claim to an exclusive market for Japanese economic activity.

While Japan took the process further and to greater effect, other non-white/non-western states adopted territorial expansion as a strategy of both state building and to resist the imperialist threat. European military campaigns gave rise to modernizing states and the so-called ‘secondary empires’ of Muhammad Ali in Egypt and the Zulu Kingdom in southern Africa. Gunboat diplomacy and the imposition of the unequal treaties in Asia touched off anti-western self-strengthening and defensive modernization movements in China and Turkey. Both states strove, like Japan, to modernize military and economic institutions, and to deploy armed force to maximize territorial claims in a vigorous defense of Qing and Ottoman empires. All this, too, became both cause and effect of the ‘new imperialism,’ joining the intensification of European power politics to over-determine the scramble for territory in the late nineteenth century. Competitive, creeping, and preemptive empire building pitted long-time rivals against one another; at the same time, the dynamics of defensive imperialisms brought a host of new challengers into the arena. Indeed, a new look at the problem of Japanese expansionism suggests that it was not alone in overthrowing 400 years of European domination. Situated within the entanglements and mutual determinations of a global geometry of empire, the Japanese story helps us script a more multi-dimensional account of the dynamics of the ‘new imperialism’ of the late nineteenth century.

Looking for comparability instead of singularity likewise brings into view a number of suggestive affinities in the relationship between nation and empire. Indeed, early Meiji foreign policy illustrates a slippage between nation and empire that was pervasive in the nineteenth-century world, as the forms and technologies of empire-states and nation-states became part of a global circuit of exchange, encouraged by the advantages accruing to territorial possessions and military power to maximize (and wield) sovereignty within the inter-state system. Thus, Japan supports recent arguments that we should look at nation and empire as compatible political forms, rather than representing a linear progression where empires break up into nations or nations develop into empires. It was significant, in this regard, that the rebel coalition that overthrew the Tokugawa
Shogunate in 1868 chose the ‘Empire of Japan’ to designate the new state (a more literal translation of Dai Nippon Teikoku is ‘Greater Empire of Japan’), where ‘empire’ was doubly signified to refer to a state in which sovereignty was vested in a restored emperor as well as the territories under imperial rule. In this sense ‘Japan’ represented dual projects of nation-state and empire-state. After overthrowing the Tokugawa authorities in 1868, the new government was immediately faced with the task of integrating the former 250 semi-autonomous domains that had provided the locus of identity and community for the ruling samurai class, while simultaneously clarifying the boundaries of the Empire to encompass frontier zones beyond the limits of the Tokugawa federation.

As Japan’s rebel leaders established the legal foundations for a modern state and a nationalized citizenry, they drew from their readings of international law as well as their observations of the international ‘law of the jungle.’ Predicting winners in what they regarded as a struggle between the strong and the weak, government leaders followed institutional models for French law, British industry, American education, and German constitutionalism. At the same time, in speeches, journalism, and a stream of political novels, anti-government activists set forth alternative models for a ‘little Japan’, anti-imperialist nation-state: Parnell’s Ireland, Arabi Pasha’s Egypt, the Carlists in Spain, Chinese, Korean, Turkish, Indian and Hungarian revolutionary and reform movements: a global fraternity joined in spirit against domestic tyranny and foreign aggression. All these went into the mix.

In 1868, there was no such thing as the Japanese nation, either as a concept or a social formation: this had to be developed through such institutions as the compulsory educational system and a conscript military, as well as a university system with disciplines of national literature and intellectual history. These and other nationalizing institutions achieved a stability and uniformity by the 1890s, just in time for a decade of imperial warfare to intensify connections between imperialism and nationalism in both material and ideological terms. Classical theories of imperialism linked expansionism with ‘extreme’ nationalism and a mob ‘psychology of jingoism.’ Such ideas applied to popular support for Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, which became moments of outpouring of nationalistic fervour, expressed in a growing mass media, and whipped up by politicians and activists, journalists and publishers, and government leaders. The embrace of imperial ambitions made fateful choices for economic and political structures within the new nation-state, and served to cement support for state goals under the slogan ‘rich country-strong military.’ Early political parties made common cause with military authoritarianism; both found anti-foreignism and racist nationalism an effective rallying cry. The turn to an aggressive foreign policy brought in train a set of consequences, of which extreme nationalism represented only one expression.

It is important to recall that adapting the nation-state form, Japanese reformers did not always imagine the nation as a single ethnicity, which complicated the formulation of ‘one people, one state, one territory.’ The ambiguity of Japan’s constitution as both empire-state and nation-state was expressed in diverging theories on the ethnic origins of the Japanese nation, culture, and civilization. One camp adhered to the idea of a single
bloodline—the Yamato race—that traced its roots to the mytho-historical origins of the Yamato state in 660 BC. Another, equally influential, line of thought argued that the ancestors of the Yamato people that populated the four main islands of the archipelago represented a multi-ethnic mix of peoples from Northeast, Southeast, and Pacific Asia. In the latter case, imagining the hybrid anthropological origins of the population of the Japanese archipelago made it easy to contemplate the incorporation of the Ryukyu Kingdom to the south and the Ainu lands to the north; indeed, with the annexation of Korea in 1910, an estimated 30% of Japanese subjects of the emperor were not ‘Japanese’.\(^\text{12}\) The pure race and multi-ethnic nation camps mapped onto alternate strategies for managing difference, which in any case did not imply equality. As the boundaries of the Empire expanded, growing numbers of ‘non-Japanese’ subjects became the targets of competing projects of assimilation and separation. The nationalist imaginary held possibilities for both racist and pan-Asian anti-imperialisms that pushed back against the Western threat, just as nationalist discourse could justify the spread of Japanese sovereignty over the Pacific and Asia in the name of historical mission.\(^\text{13}\) Though the turn-of-the-century wars with China and Russia tilted the ideological field in favor of an alliance of nationalism and expansionism, both visions of a ‘greater’ and a ‘little’ Japan remain immanent to the nation-state, even to the present day.

During the late nineteenth-century conjuncture when the international law of the jungle appeared to pose the choice of either sitting down at the table or being served up as the feast, defensive modernization became linked to defensive imperialism and the idea that Japan needed an empire as a matter of national survival took root. While advocates for a ‘greater Japan’ were often the loudest voices in the room, critics of imperialism envisioned a path to the future without territorial expansion; such ‘little Japan’ imaginaries remained part of an alternative tradition in foreign policy thinking. Though historians have often misrecognized the winning arguments in this debate for ‘realism,’ underpinning the triumph of pro-imperialism over anti-imperialism was the false choice between expansion and destruction.\(^\text{14}\)

**Imperialists Against Imperialism**

Japanese expansion from the teens through World War Two took place within a terrain dramatically altered by the First World War. Although Asia was mostly a side story in the military and diplomatic history of the Great War, it became an important staging ground for a paradigm shift in the norms and forms of empire. China, Korea, Indochina, and India all generated powerful anti-colonial nationalist movements that sent both ideas and organizational models in global motion. Asian nationalists attended the Paris Peace Conference and reported in the nationalist press on Wilson’s endorsement of the principal of national self-determination and the territorial settlements that embodied it. They saw in the League of Nations a repudiation of gunboat diplomacy and military conquest, as well as the possibilities of international law to reclaim lost sovereignty. The Russian
Revolution sent shock waves throughout Asia, as a central player in the imperialist alliance switched sides and exposed the perfidy of the Allied powers with the publication of the secret treaties declaring opposition to imperialism and providing technical and organizational assistance through the network of Comintern advisers to communist and nationalist organizations throughout Asia. Within Japan, the Comintern influenced the Japan Communist Party, the Japan Socialist Party, and a generation of intellectuals that matriculated Tokyo Imperial University. Liberal anti-imperialists embraced Wilson’s vision; radical anti-imperialists championed Lenin’s ideas; self-proclaimed ‘Japanists’ issued calls for a pan-Asian union under Japan’s leadership. Within Japan and throughout Asia, nationalists mobilized ideas of Wilsonianism and the Russian revolution to endorse competing projects to reorganize the region.\(^{15}\)

Changes in Asia articulated with global conditions for a ‘new-new imperialism’ after the First World War, one that pushed back everywhere against the old imperialism of the scramble. As Prasenjit Duara notes, the late nineteenth-century alignment of nationalism and imperialism broke apart in the wake of World War One and created a division between imperialist nationalisms on the one hand and anti-imperialist nationalisms on the other.\(^{16}\) The World War One settlement rejected what William Langer called the ‘diplomacy of imperialism’ and framed empires and imperialist ultra-nationalism as part of a passing international order.\(^{17}\) Rendered hollow by the carnage of the Great War, the European civilizational discourse of progress and humanism became vulnerable to reproach by anti-colonial nationalisms, further eviscerating the legitimacy of Western imperialism. This process took place unevenly across the globe, and went further and faster in regions like the middle east where the vanquished watched their colonial empires dismantled than in Africa where the victors left their colonial empires mostly intact.

New empires sanctioned by new ideologies arose, even while the old order and its old beneficiaries came under withering critique. In the Americas and the Caribbean, a US empire of client states and corporate colonies took shape, assembled through military interventions justified in the name of democracy and free enterprise; in Asia a Soviet ‘empire of nations’ emerged, ennobled by a vision of communist fraternity, ethnic pluralism, and autarky. Self-proclaimed ‘have not’ nations like Germany and Italy defended their expansionisms as a matter of national survival and called for an equal share of world resources, denouncing as hypocrisy efforts to obstruct them while leaving in place the vast colonial empires established under the old order. Empires of liberty, justice, and equality emerged in the changed world after World War One, as imperialism took new forms and new justifications that advocated colonization under the cloak of anti-imperialism or declared itself to be something else entirely.\(^{18}\)

Japan joined this crowded field of states making territorial claims in the name of opposing old style imperialism, a project that in this case was less a repudiation of earlier tactics of expansionism than an embrace of the possibilities opened up by European retreat and the rise of anti-colonial nationalism. From the turn of the century through World War One and beyond, Japan engaged in a steady pursuit of an expanding menu of imperial interests in...
the face of a rapidly changing international context. The outbreak of World War One and
the withdrawal of European power from the region provided an opening for Japanese
commercial, military, and diplomatic interests to aggressively expand their influence in
Asia. Japan forced concessions on China for railway development, factories, military
garrisons, and political advisors, dramatically extending the scope of Japanese control in
Manchuria and establishing a foothold all along the coast. Japanese trading firms
temporarily captured European export markets from China to India. Japan entered the
war on the Allied side and took over German holdings in Micronesia and North China.
The Japanese army took part in the Allied Siberian Expedition against the Bolshevik Red
Army in 1918 and remained fighting in Siberia until 1922, two long years after the other
armies departed. As one of the victorious Allied powers, Japan joined the ‘Big Five’ at the
Paris Peace Conference in 1918, coming to the table with its own list of demands and
becoming part of the theater of diplomacy on the world stage. The speed and force of
Japan’s play for regional power, as well as the challenge posed by Chinese nationalism,
prompted American diplomats to organize the Washington Conference of 1921–1922.
New realities on the ground gave rise to a treaty structure that dismantled the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, initiated naval disarmament in the Pacific, and endorsed China’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Although the new diplomacy that emerged from the Paris and Washington Conferences of
1919–1922 did not change many minds about the importance of keeping and growing the
empire, it generated lively debate on the meaning of the new world order, and Japan’s
place within it. For many civic and political leaders, Japan’s takeover of Germany’s Asia-
Pacific empire, a new rivalry with Great Britain in China, and engagement with Asian
reformers in the British and French empires all signaled a shift in the balance of power
between West and East. In their eyes, Japanese representation at the Peace Conference
and in the League of Nations created a voice for a newly assertive Asia in world affairs;
Japan’s rise as a great power meant that Asia, too, had arrived. The liberal-minded
intelligentsia and foreign policy elite embraced these changes as conducive to ‘peaceful
expansionism’ and advocated modifications to accommodate nationalist demands in
Korea, Taiwan, and China.19

But others read the record in less sanguine terms. They regarded America with suspicion
and US diplomacy as an effort to reverse Japan’s hard won gains. They took umbrage at
Japan’s exclusion from the councils of the ‘big four’ and the ‘big three’ in Paris and
questioned the willingness of a white club of nations to ever include Japan. They noted
that Japan’s request to place a ‘racial equality clause’ in the preamble of the Covenant of
the League of Nations went down in humiliating defeat, even after diplomats offered draft
after draft of increasingly anodyne language.20 As the racial diplomacy in Paris was
quickly followed by the enactment of Japanese Exclusion with the passage of the 1924
Immigration Act in the US Congress, the race issue poisoned relations with America in
some quarters and haunted China diplomacy of the 1920s. Japanese thus regarded the
new world order with ambivalence: some saw a new ‘cosmopolitanism’ that recognized

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the rise of Japan as a world power and East and West as co-equals, others, a racial double standard applied to their imperial aspirations.

Tensions in the messaging of World War One reverberated within a politics of empire grown increasingly layered, the result of proliferating entanglements between an empire-state and a nation-state that were no longer mere abstractions. With the military buildups and economic booms of a rapid succession of wars between 1894 and 1922, big business grew fat on army contracts and became a formidable military-industrial complex. As the national boundary expanded, key sectors of the economy became locked into the empire for strategic resources and export markets: sugar in Okinawa and Taiwan, rice in Korea and Taiwan, iron, coal, and soybeans in Manchuria, and an outlet for growing textile manufactures throughout East and Southeast Asia. Colonial railroads and banks, a colonial civil service (police, education, administration), and military garrisons were established as extensions of state institutions that connected the home islands with the empire and constituted a host of sub-imperialist interests that used their positions as springboards for further expansion. Since sub-imperial interests did not speak with a single voice, sub-imperial projects competed with one another to be heard. Army officers did battle with diplomats; textile exporters shouted over railway interests. Taiwan became a staging ground for a push South that competed with a Manchurian faction advocating the priority of the North.  

Even while multiplying interests and projects deepened and complicated the stakes in empire, imperial expansion meant a national politics increasingly geared to the world stage. Politics became both local and imperial. Activists promoted workers’ rights at home and participation in the International Labor Organization. The army established a propaganda wing and mobilized a network of reservist associations to encourage support for army budgets and alert the public to the dangers of disarmament. Membership in the League of Nations buoyed up domestic support for a ‘little Japan’ vision of foreign relations articulated by liberal intellectuals, political leaders, and the business press. Socialists and Communist intellectuals from Japan connected through Comintern networks to intellectuals from China, Taiwan and Korea. Radical rightwing organizationsspeechified about the ‘red peril’ that interlinked threats of communism in the home islands and in the empire. For left, right, and centre, a political stance on domestic concerns implied a particular position on China, Korea, and Taiwan.

The increasing interpenetration of empire and nation made it easy to turn to the colonies as spatial fix to the gathering national crisis of the late 1920s, a crisis experienced on multiple fronts. The 1920s were challenging years for all industrialized societies, Japan not the least as a decade of ‘economic muddle’ ended in a 1927 bank panic and a tottering national economy slid ignominiously into the global crash of 1929. The multi-front socio-economic crisis of the early 1930s—agrarian stagnation and mass starvation in Japan’s Northeast, unprecedented urban unemployment in cities large and small, plummeting exports to all of Japan’s critical markets, the devastating decision to return to the gold standard in 1930 only to abandon it a year later—fed an atmosphere of desperation and panic. The demonstrable failure of existing political, economic, and
social institutions to ‘overcome the deadlock’ encouraged calls for state renovation and radical solutions, and ennobled the seductions of fascism. Attention turned to the Asian continent, where Japan’s position appeared embattled by a rising Chinese nationalist movement. Focused increasingly on overturning the legal structure that underpinned Japan’s railroad imperialism in Northeast China, the Chinese boycotted Japanese goods and struck Japanese-owned factories to demand the recovery of rights signed away over decades of gunboat diplomacy. Against the backdrop of global trade friction and tariff wars, the China market became Japan’s ‘imperial lifeline’ and the justification for an army-led the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Widely popular, the Japanese public vigorously supported the occupation of Northeast China and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo, as well as the withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933.

Japan embarked on a wave of aggressive military expansionism and the construction of a new order over the 1930s and 1940s that signified the creation of new colonial forms in Asia as well as radical transformation in metropolitan institutions within Japan. An army ascendant in China empowered military ambitions at home and the success of conspirators in Manchuria licensed a wave of coup attempts and political assassinations in the imperial capital. Establishment elites joined army officers in the fascization of the state from above, with the creation of the ‘thought police,’ the ‘controlled economy,’ and a single mass political party (the Imperial Rule Assistance Association) as instruments of the national defense state and total war.

The New Order at home articulated with a New Order in Asia whose expanding boundaries were expressed through the series of official slogans that punctuated the decade: the declaration of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia in 1934 (colonial empire plus Manchukuo), the New Order for East Asia in 1938 (adding China), and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940 (adding Southeast Asia). Official Asianism embraced a vision of regional autarky—the ‘Yen bloc’—among an Asian family of nations headed by Japan as well as a mission to push the West out of Asia. Asianism tried to align Japan’s interests with demands of anti-colonial nationalism by heralding programs of coordinated industrial development and the co-prosperity of trade in the yen bloc. Starting with Manchukuo, Japan sponsored client regimes and mass parties throughout its newly occupied territories, where teams of Japanese ‘advisors’ dictated policy to new Asian leaders. By claiming common cause with Asian nationalists in the fight against the White Peril of imperialism on the one hand and the Red Peril of communism on the other, pan-Asianism provided a mantle of legitimacy for Japan’s new colonial projects. While mass party organizations like the Concordia Association in Manchukuo proclaimed pan-Asianism through such slogans as the ‘harmony of the five races’ (Japanese, Manchu, Korean, Han Chinese, Mongolian), this was aimed as much at the Japanese population in the main islands as it was at the subjects of the multi-ethnic state. Though architects of Japanese pan-Asianism were transfixed by the potency of an ideology that led to Japan being ‘greeted as liberators’ in Southeast Asia, in the long run this comforting delusion
probably made the greater impact by drumming up enthusiasm for a vastly expanded war front among a public that had been at war for nearly ten years.\textsuperscript{23}

Though pan-Asianism is frequently viewed as a peculiar expression of Japanese ultranationalism, there are family resemblances between the many ‘pan’ movements that arose in the twentieth century—pan-Africanism, pan-Germanism, and pan-Asianism among them. In the latter case, at least, pan-Asianism absorbed a host of competing nationalist agendas—anticolonial nationalisms, self-determining ethnonationalisms, imperialist ultranationalisms, Occidentalisms, self-Orientalisms, jingoisms, xenophobias—that brought theories of imperialism and theories of nationalism into a tangled web of confusions and contradictions. And yet, pan-Asianism managed to sustain its force as a transcendent idea across the twentieth century and even into the new millennium. This is more than just a ‘Japan and Asia’ story, and suggests we explore the ways that nationalisms of all stripes aligned themselves with expansionism in the name of justice, liberty, and equality.

As the global appearance of the ‘pan’ movements makes clear, the circulation of ideologies of imperialism and nationalism, as well as the global synchronicities that helped such ideas gain traction, confound models of diffusion or convergence. While it is common to note the ways the tactics and ideology of Japanese imperialism imitated the West, the reverse was also true. In this connection, the strange career of Manchukuo bears a close look. As an instance of an empire that tried hard to disguise itself as something else, Manchukuo offered to later crypto-colonialisms an important source of tactics and ideas. Perhaps most striking were ways Manchukuo was mined as a laboratory for counter-insurgency warfare against Communist guerilla forces, especially those using Maoist tactics. American military planners in Vietnam studied the Japanese campaigns in Manchuria carefully, taking note of the so-called ‘three all’ policy (kill all, burn all, loot all), and the efforts to isolate and secure rural peasants as allies, reformulated by Americans as the ‘strategic hamlet program.’\textsuperscript{24} Japanese organizers of the ‘independence movement’ that launched Manchukuo went to considerable trouble to provide a veneer of sovereignty, disguising colonialism under a bilateral treaty structure that legalized Manchukuo’s position under Japan’s security umbrella. The similarities between the colonialism of the wartime yen bloc and America’s Cold War ‘empire of bases’ were not lost on Japanese critics of the US–Japan alliance system established in 1952, who denounced the humiliation of becoming ‘America’s Manchukuo’.\textsuperscript{25} What Geir Lundestad famously called an American ‘empire by invitation’ became a doppelganger for Manchukuo in other ways as well: by cloaking expansionism with support for ‘independence movements’ and proclaiming a US-led democratic ‘revolution in Asia’; by using the soft power of Americanism as handmaiden to economic expansionism; by deploying the imperialism of development for the development of imperialism. Thus America, like Japan, imitated and adapted models of empire building that were discursively co-constituted within the inter-state system and the global capitalist market. Much as Benedict Anderson observed for the technology of nationalism, the tactics and
ideologies of empire proved transplantable and portable across spaces and times connected through modern knowledge economies and other mediums of intellectual exchange.
Client State/ Client Empire

In the aftermath of defeat in 1945, the ‘Great Empire of Japan’ collapsed into the ‘island nation of Japan.’ The seven-year occupation that followed surrender served to integrate the new Japan into an American-dominated economic and security bloc in Asia as the boundaries of the nation-state shrank to the four main islands of the archipelago and their adjacent islands and islets. Many things changed for Japan in the new and rigidly divided regional order—most notably economic ties with Mainland China were cut off. But other things remained much the same, as Japan reestablished a dominant trading and investment position within its former empire in Taiwan, Korea, and Southeast Asia. The mechanisms of this reorganization of regional order emerged from the particularities of Asia as a zone of action in the Cold War and made Japan at once the workshop of Asia—regional nexus of free market capitalism and engine of regional economic growth—as well as the super domino that would never fall to Communist revolution.

Conversion from America’s main enemy in a hot war in the Pacific to its principal ally in a cold war in Asia relied on a quid pro quo: in exchange for submission to American military and foreign policy, Japan gained privileged access to Asian markets within the American bloc, becoming at once a client state and a client empire. This inaugurated an arrangement that effectively divided the military and economic labour of domination between Japan and the US: America used its network of bases in Northeast and Southeast Asia to carry out a new variant of gunboat diplomacy that helped recreate and sustain Japanese economic hegemony in the region.

In contrast with Cold War structures in Europe, America managed its relationships in Asia through a system of bilateral security treaties that channeled trade and investment flows in bilateral directions as well, and placed the US in the middle of virtually all forms of exchange between Asian countries. In the early phase of this history, Japan reestablished an informal trading imperium within what Chalmers Johnson called America’s ‘empire of bases’ in Asia. Client states like Japan permitted a permanent military occupation by US forces and agreed to serve as launching points for ‘containment,’ a voluntary subordination that was facilitated by large amounts of military and economic aid and that weighted the domestic political order towards conservative anti-communism.

In Japan’s case, a bureaucratic single party state reemerged in the wake of the US occupation, underpinned by an ‘iron triangle’ linking big business, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the bureaucracy—a political order captured in such phrases as ‘Japan, Inc.’ and ‘corporatism without labor.’ Among the occupation reforms aimed broadly at Japan’s democratization and demilitarization were sweeping changes in education, land tenure, civil rights, and most significant for the nature of the state: the renunciation of the right to wage war enshrined in Article 9 of the new constitution. Like the wide-ranging transformations of the Meiji period that instituted defensive modernization nearly a century before, postwar reforms took place within a set of international
pressures, which helped conservatives win battles with progressives over labour law, the reappearance of wartime elites in the postwar state, and the question of alignment in the new world order. The constraints and the opportunities of American power inclined government leaders to provide a supporting role for the Korean and Vietnam Wars, both of which offered timely economic stimulus in the form of special procurements as well as integrating Japan’s reconstituted Self Defense Forces under US command and control. In the early years of the Cold War, the ‘dialectic of the internal and the external’ meant that profiteering from US wars in Asia financed economic recovery and high growth, even the fate of the new state and its iron triangle stakeholders became bound to export-led development and the reestablishment of economic hegemony over parts of the former yen bloc. In this way, a partially reconstituted bureaucratic-authoritarian state (with its military arm amputated) was linked to a partially reconstituted Asian empire (with its military operations outsourced).

Japan’s privileged position within America’s empire of bases relied on rebuilding key parts of the wartime yen bloc, a process that differed between its southern and northern spheres and changed over time. American policy makers initially sought to set up Southeast Asia as replacement for lost markets in China and Korea, reestablishing the Co-prosperity Sphere within the territories of French, British, and Dutch empires once lost, then regained, then lost once again to Japan. With American complicity, reparations for Japanese war crimes became the instrument for economic penetration of Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. Advised by the same handful of large trading firms who dominated the wartime economy, the Japanese government tied reparations payments to purchases of goods and services, allowing Japanese companies to reestablish a foothold in Southeast Asia as a market for light industrial products and for purchases of natural resources.

This laid the groundwork for a transformation of Japan’s economic footprint in the 1970s, when Southeast Asia became a ‘pollution haven’ for companies facing pressure from community movements within Japan that opposed environmental degradation and pollution-related diseases. Direct investment overtook trade as the prime mechanism of economic imperialism, and Japanese firms transformed themselves into multi-national companies, dividing production between components manufacture in the home islands and assembly in Southeast Asia. This division of labour had the advantage of turning Southeast Asian assembly plants into proxy exporters to western markets, evading the trade restrictions beginning to be placed on Japanese products. All this accelerated after 1985, when the Plaza Accords reset exchange rates, sent the yen skyrocketing, and created huge capital reserves that flowed outward to the US, Europe, and Asia. New Japanese investments now concentrated in low-cost components factories intended to supply Japanese-owned assembly plants nearby.

South Korea and Taiwan became additions to a Japanese sphere of influence within the American bloc slightly later and followed a different pattern. Themselves client states and under semi-permanent US occupation, leaders of both countries welcomed teams of American advisors to direct economic policy and agreed to the reentry of Japanese capital.
on a large scale in the 1960s. This process established asymmetrical patterns of trade, where Japan occupied a much larger share of South Korean and Taiwanese markets than the reverse. At the same time, both countries became receptacles for Japan’s declining industries. Rising wages within Japan drove textile firms to offshore their production to Taiwan and South Korea in the 1970s, followed by consumer electronics, steel, and automobiles from the 1980s. Japan’s expanding presence in Taiwanese and South Korean economies compromised American capacity to unilaterally dictate policy to their leaders, and provided more political autonomy from the US in exchange for greater dependence on Japanese capital. In the triangular relationships that emerged, the US maintained regional dominance through military strength and by monopolizing strategic supplies of oil and grain, while Japanese big business exercised commanding power via market share and ownership of production.

Patterns of postwar political economy connected imperial formations in the prewar to imperial formations in the postwar. The relationship between developmental states in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan traced its roots back to the prewar yen bloc that offshored some Japanese production and coordinated regional industry through a state-directed division of labour among Japan’s colonies and its home islands. Beginning in the 1960s, Japanese investment in South Korea and Taiwan helped finance import-substitution and a modified command economy as strategies for industrial development. As with exports, a small group of large enterprises monopolized Japan’s direct foreign investment. Their investment strategies in both North and Southeast Asia underpinned a conversion to multinational capital beginning in the 1970s. Repeating a process integral to the development of capitalism in prewar Japan, big business went multinational through a regional division of labour between Japanese-owned plants throughout the northern and southern spheres of the reconstituted yen bloc. Interconnected developmental states tilted domestic political fields towards conservative rule and guaranteed an oversized influence of a few large multinational firms in state governance in all three countries.

This set up the conditions for Japanese imperial ideology to reemerge under the new guise of the East Asian developmental state, putatively invented by Japan in the late nineteenth century and characterized by weak democracies, Confucian values, and the privileging of economic growth over all else. The imperialism of East Asian development was captured in the resurrection of the 1930s ‘flying geese’ theory in the 1970s. As the lead goose (Japan) moved through cycles of product development, it transferred its older technologies to the geese flying directly behind (Taiwan and South Korea), which in turn passed their declining industries to the next row (Southeast Asia). Much as claims of ‘development’ that brought railroads and education to the colonies justified Japanese military occupation before 1945, the flying geese metaphor euphemized Japanese economic domination after 1945 as ‘Asian-style industrialization’ that benefitted the follower geese; at the same time, it occluded the military alliance structure and the omnipresence of American soldiers and sailors that kept all geese in their proper place.
This did not strike many observers as an imperialist ideology perhaps because it was the ideology of American imperialism as well. Indeed, from the early years of the Cold War to the present, American soft power served as an important supplement to hard power in the Asian regional order. Exports of US-based modernization theory that made Japan (and more recently Korea) into models for development; Americanism and an American dream that celebrated consumption and ever-improving lifestyle; ‘peace and prosperity’ under the shelter of the American security umbrella (that also sheltered Asia from a remilitarized Japan): all became naturalized as a Japanese dream of postwar national rebirth, even while they disguised Japanese-American imperialism under the cloak of a paternalistic American hegemony.

The reluctance to admit continuities between the Japanese empire before and after 1945 connected to a more general ‘amnesia of empire’ in public memory and a near absence of a ‘post-imperial’ subjectivity. A disavowal of the imperial past was abetted by the circumstances of decolonization, which occurred in the context of defeat by allies rather than an anti-colonial revolution or under pressure from a nationalist movement. In most of the Japanese empire, new powers tried to assert control almost immediately in the wake of defeat: Russia took over the former empire in Manchuria and North Korea; the US occupied South Korea and the Pacific islands; the British, French, and Dutch laid claim to their former empires in Southeast Asia; and the Chinese Nationalist Party recolonized Taiwan. These multiple new colonialisms and Cold War imperialisms provided an easy alibi for ‘The Great Empire of Japan’ to escape judgment from its own citizens and from others.

Nothing symbolized this better than the invitation, in 1955, for Japan to attend the Bandung Conference along with twenty-four newly independent Asian and African states. For much of the world, Bandung represented the birth of the nonaligned movement and raised a collective cry of opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism. For Japan, it signaled an ironic inversion of prewar exceptionalism: before the war Japan had entered the Western great power club as the single ‘honorary white imperialist’; after the war it joined the club of newly independent states as the single ‘honorary victim of colonialism.’ At home, intellectuals embraced the ‘Bandung spirit,’ but mostly as a critique of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty that made Japan into an object of American neo-colonialism, rather than as an opportunity to rethink Japan’s own imperial history. In fact, identification with postwar ‘third worldism’ became another way for both left and right to claim semi-colonial status and disavow an imperialist subjectivity.

Instead of looking to the empire, over the postwar decades public memory has remained transfixed with the question of war responsibility and historical revisionism. Especially in its final days, Japan’s colonial empire was the province and project of the army and navy; it was indelibly inked with militarism. When Japan lost the war, the public blamed their military leaders for defeat and lost their appetite for imperialism along with their appetite for militarism. This conceptual fusing of imperialism with militarism and their mutual discrediting profoundly shaped the ways empire was figured in public memory. The legacies of empire became sublimated into the long list of debates about the conduct of
the war: the treatment of the war in public school textbooks; the designation of a national anthem and its ritual singing at school events; the status of the Yasukuni shrine, where the war dead were interred; the issue of forced prostitution and the euphemistically named ‘comfort women’; the battles over denying the Nanjing massacre; to name a few. The so-called history wars surrounding these various issues are folded into debates about fascism and militarism, but in fact speak to questions of military imperialism.37 With the sublimation of imperialism into militarism, Japan could endlessly debate how to come to terms with one past without directly engaging another. In the process, public memory served as handmaiden to a crypto-imperialism that outsourced military operations to its American patron—a postwar empire without militarism that connected seamlessly to a prewar militarism without empire. In this way, operations of memory helped constitute an empire that remained largely invisible to the imperialists, the Japanese public who chose not to acknowledge economic hegemony over a refashioned yen bloc, the slow violence of their pollution industries in Southeast Asia, or the role of Japanese capital in shoring up Asian police states, as examples of postwar Japan as empire.38

Where does this leave us in terms of thinking about the ends of empire? As the Japanese case illustrates, imperial endings can be deceiving. Just as an early modern age of empire was swept aside by a wave of political revolutions, the global reverberations of the advent of industrial capitalism and nationalism ushered in a new age of empire. The ‘new imperialism’ of the late nineteenth century gave way to a colonialism of puppet states during the interwar decades; this was followed in the wake of World War Two by decolonization and ‘imperialism without colonies.’ Within these global conjunctures, changes in the forms of Japanese imperialism were dictated by a host of factors: international norms about instrumental violence and the law of war, human rights and questions of citizenship, sovereignty and nationalism; the evolution of the inter-state system, international law, and organizations of world government that set the conditions of possibility for state action; and transformations and residues within the nation-empire-state that both acted and reacted within a global environment. Yet even as new structures emerged, older forms bled into new realities and newer forms assimilated existing ‘facts on the ground.’ Thus, Japanese imperialism in the era of treaty ports and gunboat diplomacy drew on a longstanding Confucian logic of the Sino-centric tribute system. Both pan-Asianism in the 1930s and crypto-imperialism in the 1960s contended with the inheritance of earlier imperial moments.

This chapter has focused on three global conjunctures when one form of empire gave way to another. The turning points were event-driven and bear out William Sewell’s concept of ‘eventful temporality’: that causal structures are not uniform through time because events transform both social structure and social causality.39 In East Asia the Opium Wars and the treaty port system in the mid-nineteenth century; the establishment of a new order in Asia after World War One; and the rise of American cold war hegemony after World War Two represented such big events and their consecutive reconfigurations of regional social relations. These events over determined transformations in states, nations,
and empires, as well as the ways these articulated with each other and the regional order. Thinking the larger story of empire through the Japanese example offers one way of grasping the persistence of imperial structures through these times of momentous transformation, even into the turn of the millennium and the present day.  

Notes:

(1) Historians use the term ‘new imperialism’ to describe the acceleration of European military expansion in the late nineteenth century, epitomized by the ‘scramble for Africa.’ The Wisconsin School speaks of a new American imperialism emerging at the same time, using diplomacy and economic power to expand interests abroad. My own use of this term seeks to place the nineteenth-century conjuncture within a longer history of European expansion that begins in the sixteenth century with the colonization of the Americas and the establishment of coastal footholds in Asia. With the first wave of decolonization in the Americas, the ‘age of empire’ was followed by an ‘age of revolution.’ Over the course of the nineteenth-century nationalism and industrialization triggered a second wave of European expansion creating both informal ‘empires of free trade’ and formal colonies of rule in Asia, Africa, and the Americas—the ‘new imperialism’ of which Japan was a part.


The phrase comes from J. A. Hobson’s book by the same title, published in 1901. See also works of Hannah Arendt, David Fieldhouse, and George Lichtheim discussed in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).


(23) I deal with this history in more depth in *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).


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